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A.

BY WAY OF AN EXPLANATION.
I have been asked to provide the private landowner's perspective on
"proposed legislative reforms" for re authorization of the Endangered Species Act
(ESA): Not content with such a broad theme, I intend to widen it further to
include: not only the ESA, but also such related topics as biological diversity,
ecosystem management, and protection of living resources generally; not only
legislative, but also administrative, reforms; and not only private landowners but
the larger community of private interests that are regulated for the purpose of
protecting living resources. Although much of what I will say here reflects my
own thinking, I frequently will grossly simplify and starkly portray
(mischaracterize?) issues that are far more subtle. The issues will be addressed in
hyperbolic language, with the conspicuous absence of any research or many cited
sources, and without any pretense of comprehensive or balanced treatment. I take
this approach to be provocative but also to adhere to at least the principal
assignment of my speech topic - the task of imparting the raw-nerved perspective
of those who are truly the subject of living resources protection regulation and not
the more dispassionate views of the professionals whom they are compelled to
retain by the prospect of such regulation.1
I will begin with a discussion that will provide some context to the
regulated community's views about living resources protection (and also explain
why I have used the term "living resources") and then describe nine reasons
(they're more but I tired) why the community considers regulation under the ESA,
or in the name of biological diversity or ecosystem management, with such
substantial trepidation.2

1 Yes, I said "subject," and this may be the first, and most basic, perspective to be conveyed -unlike some advocates of the ESA, biological diversity conservation, and ecosystem management,
who may consider those laws and policies to be devoted exclusively to the protection of living
resources, as seen by the regulated community those laws and policies first and foremost impose
burdens on it from which secondarily benefits may be derived for living resources.
2 A second parenthetical before I begin: By discussing seriatim a goodly number of
concerns —both the reasonable and unreasonable —about living resource protection in the manner
I've described, I am a bit apprehensive that I will unintentionally portray the regulated community
as a collection of "scorn[ful] Miniver Cheevy's, who "loveO the days of old" and "as6ail[)" the entire
concept of living resource protection. Suffice it to say that few of the regulated hold all of the
concerns I identify and many of the regulated, as has been described by other speakers, are
actively working to ensure better protection of living resources and better procedures to secure that
protection.
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B.

A NEW ERA OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION.

The topic of this conference reflects a profound shift in environmental
regulation that is already well under way. Over the past two and a half decades
since Earth Day, both the regulated - industry, developers, and property owners and the regulators - State and Federal officials - have painfully, but for the most
part successfully, acclimated themselves to the ever-expanding volume of laws and
regulations devoted to environmental protection. Until recently, however, these
environmental laws and regulations have required the regulated and regulators to
pay close attention to only the non-living resources, such as air, water, and waste.
Certainly before Earth Day and even during much of this era of
environmental lawmaking, living resources were largely ignored in the law and
practice of environmental protection. If either the regulated or regulators gave
thought to living resources at all, it was likely to arise more from a concern for
public opinion than from any particular legal obligation. And this concern clearly
focussed on the most popular vertebrates - the so-called charismatic megafauna —
and dissipated rapidly, or was not expressed at all, for species further down the
food chain, particularly invertebrates and plants.
Until the enactment, and the recently, more pervasive and invasive
implementation of, the Endangered Species Act and except for migratory species
protected by international treaties, federal environmental laws and regulations did
not feature and seldom referred to living resources. Of the many reasons for this
relative lack of attention to living resources, two stand out. First, non-living
resources had a more direct connection with human health and safety —a
traditional and constitutionally secure arena for federal regulation. The effects of
poisoned air, water, or soil on humans were obvious. However, the most
overworked and tiresome analogy in environmental discourse —the celebrated
canary in the coal mine - had not yet been employed widely to connect the health
of living resources with human health. Second, with the exception of the
treaty-blessed species, the common law and judicial interpretation of the
Constitution placed virtually exclusive responsibility for wildlife management with
the States. And the States, of course, for reasons of tradition and revenue
concentrated on the management of game animals —those same charismatic
megafauna - and the regulation of recreational or subsistence activities (hunting
and fishing), not economic pursuits.
This era of virtually exclusive concern with non-living resources in
environmental regulation quite clearly is passing. Just as clearly, the new era of
environmental regulation can be discerned —and its focus is on living resources.
Why this certainty that a new era of regulation to protect living resources is under
way? First, the type, quantity, and status of wildlife on both public and private
lands have become critical threshold criteria for determining whether and to what
-2-

degree a particular industry, company, or landowner is to be regulated under the
older laws relating to non-living resources. For example, on federal lands, the
status of selected "indicator species" and "sensitive species" has been employed by
both the Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management to measure the health of
ecosystems and serve as the determinant of the need for, and level of stringency
of, the agencies' regulation of such activities as timber harvesting, mining,
grazing, and recreation projects. On private lands, not only have test organisms
in laboratories and "the protection and propagation of a balanced population of
shellfish, fish, and wildlife" in the field (wording found in any number of Clean
Water Act sections) served as the basis for discerning and regulating pollution
levels of waterbodies, but also the very presence of wildlife has been used to
determine whether waterbodies are even subject to regulation in the first place
(e.g., the Environmental Protection Agency's audaciously imaginative "glancing
duck" test that relies on visits by sojourning migratory waterfowl to transform
isolated waters into "waters of the U.S." - the statutory passwords that allow the
agency to regulate under section 404 of the Clean Water Act).
Second, we know that neither the Congress (at least the pre-"Contract"
Congress) nor the agencies are satisfied with simply making living resources the
predicate for the application of existing environmental regulatory authority
concerning non-living resources. They are improvising and advancing a whole new
environmental program devoted to living resources. You've heard all about these
efforts from previous speakers. Just the same, several scattered examples: Last
Congress several (this Congress fewer) bills were introduced that would embed the
principle of biological diversity protection in the United States Code. Chairman
George Miller of the House Natural Resources Committee (its nom du jour last
Congress) in an April 29, 1993, memorandum to Committee members announced
that the Committee, with the assistance of the Congressional Research Service
and General Accounting Office, would "begin a comprehensive examination" of
"ecosystem protection, management, and restoration," focusing on the Nation's
"most endangered ecosystems" and "what the federal agencies are doing to move
toward ecosystem management and what institutional and legal impediments
stand in the way of coordinated ecosystem protection and management." As Mr.
Irvin reports in his talk, the negotiations on ESA re authorization legislation under
the auspices of Representative Saxton have produced a legislative proposal that
would encourage "natural systems conservation planning" that is not species
specific. Down from Capitol Hill in the Executive Branch, we've all marvelled at
the extraordinary and generally admirable efforts of this Administration to make
the Endangered Species Act both more effective and more "user friendly." We've
also witnessed the unconditional and unflagging infatuation with ecosystem
management experienced by the White House and the various agencies
responsible for managing federal, and regulating private, land.

-
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REASONS WHY THE REGULATED COMMUNITY CAN’T SLEEP
NIGHTS IN THIS NEW ERA OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION.
I’m sure I'm not imparting any unusual insight when I tell you that the
regulated community has not welcomed this onrushing new era of environmental
regulation for living resources with open arms. We do not view this new
regulatory emphasis as more of the same or simply a filling of a regulatory gap.
We certainly do not accept the facile assurances of some champions of the new
regulatory era that thoughtful regulation to conserve living resources will lessen
the severity of environmental regulation generally because environmental
problems will be discovered and treated at some earlier stage when they are more
amenable to regulatory treatment. No doubt earlier regulation will cause more
environmental problems to be remedied. But earlier regulation means what it
says: "earlier regulation." And those two words are fact; other, more soothing
qualifying phrases to describe that regulation - "less restrictive," "more flexible,"
"with a lighter hand" - although continually voiced, are speculative at best.
To the contrary, the regulated community believes there are at least nine
reasons why regulation for living resources (whenever it occurs - early or late in
the evolution of environmental problems) will be far more stringent than has been
regulation for non-living resources. These reasons, discussed below, range from
the purely factual, to the purely legal, to raw assumption and myth. Some of the
problems these reasons address may be remediable or, on second view,
nonexistent, but others may well be inherent in regulation for living resource
protection and thus ultimately could be fatal to regulated community support for,
or even acquiescence in, the new regulatory era.
1. True-Believer Lawmaking; Absolutist Terms. Living resource laws
brook no dissent. They provide no flexibility in their language. From its findings
provisions to its effective date clause, the ESA is devoid of moderating phrases
which appear in the Clean Water Act, Clear Air Act, and other non-living resource
environmental laws, such as "to the extent feasible," insofar as practicable," "best
available technology," and "in the public interest." Without such tempering
language, the ESA and its mandates are absolute. Indeed, that is exactly what
the Supreme Court found 18 years ago in TVA v. Hill (437 U.S. 153 (1978)) when
it halted construction of the Tellico Dam to benefit the snail darter. The Court
stated in unequivocal language that still causes the regulated community to
hyperventilate whenever it is repeated: the Act's language "admits of no
exception", the "plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt and
reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost", and the Act
"reveals a conscious decision by Congress to give endangered species priority over
the 'primary missions' of federal agencies." Id. at 173, 194, and 185.
c.
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This phenomenon of overbearing statutory certainty is not limited to the
ESA; it infects virtually all living resource lawmaking efforts. Take biological
diversity on federal lands as an example: The concept and language of biological
diversity first appeared in 1976 in the National Forest Management Act (NFMA),
governing planning for the National Forest System. This provision (16 U.S.C.
§ 1604(g)(3)(B)) was much debated and carefully crafted; Congress imbued in it
great administrative discretion and flexibility. The statutory language directed
the agency, in preparing its resource management plans, to "provide for diversity
of plant and animal communities," and to "provide ... for steps to be taken to
preserve the diversity of tree species." To make certain that this requirement
could not and would not be interpreted as absolute or capable of overriding other
statutory direction, Congress saturated the provision with qualifying phrases and
redundancies: the Forest Service was to strive for this diversity "in order to meet
over-all multiple use objectives ... within the [plan’s] multiple use objectives ...
where appropriate ... to the degree practicable."
In the intervening years since enactment of the NFMA, the biological
diversity concept has quite clearly muscled up; no longer is it phrased in such
meek, indecisive terms. On July 23, 1991, the House of Representatives adopted a
floor amendment to legislation reauthorizing the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act (FLPMA) to provide the Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
with a biological diversity protection duty to match the Forest Service's, but with
two profound differences. The first removes all of the flexibility or "fudge words"3
contained in the NFMA provision and provides an absolute mandate - the BLM
shall take "no action to diminish biological diversity." If that isn't enough to
curtail drastically BLM management activities, the same language insists that
BLM not just maintain biological diversity but also "restore" prior diversity levels
(the buffalo, the carrier pigeon, what about the dinosaurs?). Fortunately, such
arrogant legislating was unsuccessful, not due to any outraged opposition to this
extraordinary provision, but simply because the re authorization of FLPMA has
proven to be a Sisyphean task all of itself.
So long as the ESA and other legislative initiatives for living resources
protection contain such peremptory language, federal officials will forever be
compelled to emulate Secretary Babbitt's "reform-a-month" protestations that
clever, well-meaning bureaucrats can make the law "user friendly." Never mind
that these "fixes" may be ultra vires and, absent rulemaking (these typically are
press release or guidance document reforms), cannot be used by the regulated
either to compel government performance or to defend against citizen suits.

3 G.C. Coggins, II Public Natural Resources Law § 20.22(3)(d)(iii)> pp. 20-22 (1996).
-
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2.
Science Uber Alles. As bad as the ESA's absolute language is, it is
made worse by its explicit prohibition against any consideration of economic or
other factors in the ESA's most critical decisions - the determinations that species
are endangered or threatened and thereby receive the law's protection. The ESA
requires that these decisions be made "solely on the basis of the best scientific ...
data." 16 U.S.C. 1533(b)(1)(A). Indeed, Congress added the word "solely" later,
after ESA enactment, in order to discipline the government which had had the
temerity to merely report on the economic consequences of its purely scientific
decisions.
To the regulated community, this is not just an invitation - it is an order -to conduct narrowly focussed, tunnel-visioned decisionmaking. This mandate
creates nothing less than a tyranny of scientists whose exclusive interest and duty
are to ensure the maximum wefi-b^irigbf~tKe~fish, wildlife, or plants, all other
considerations be damned. There is no "decision space" for the more traditional,
generalist decisionmakers who typically leaven the experts' judgment with broader
and more balanced considerations. Under the terms of the statute, these
decisionmakers become totally reliant on - indeed, ventriloquists' dummies for the scientists. Despite protestations that this is not so, companies and
landowners continually hear agency officials confess in their most consoling
bedside manner that they would dearly love to reach a different, more favorable
decision but their "hands are tied" by the seemingly omnipresent and omniscient
scientists, who by law are supreme.
3.
Bad or Biased Science? Reliance on science in the context of living
resources protection presents two problems. First, is the astounding lack of
information. Most species that are sufficiently at risk to be threatened or
endangered under the ESA have very small populations which makes the task of
collecting adequate and timely information about them almost insuperable. When
the intention is to conserve biological diversity or manage whole ecosystems,
rather than protect isolated species, the likelihood of generating useful and
reliable scientific information is truly bleak. That doesn't mean the decisions to
protect living resources should not be made. But, unfair or inappropriate as it
may be, faith in the integrity of science suffers exceedingly when later data
contradict the information relied on in the initial decisions. The regulated
community quickly becomes embittered when, for example, the decision to fist the
northern spotted owl in 1990 is based on the scientific judgment that there are
only 3,000 owls in existence and, yet, after fisting the count soars to 10,000 owls.
The burden science bears in protecting living resources is made heavier by
the discipline that has invaded the regulatory process -Conservation biology; The
discipline's most honest adherents readily admit that it its stifi4mmntur^and is
often stretched beyond its capacity when it is called upon, or - as the regulated
see it - so avidly volunteers, to serve those with the authority to regulate for
-6-

living resources protection.4 Worse, however, conservation biology may not be
credible. Science in the service of public policy must be neutral; if it is value-laden
or adopts an advocacy role it will skew decisionmaking. Yet, conservation biology
is blatantly biased. Time and again in statements adopted by the discipline to
describe itself and in credos for its publications, conservation biology is portrayed
as not simply the study of living resources and the causes of decline and extinction
of species. Instead, conservation biology is accorded the explicit purpose of
arresting species decline and extinction and promoting species recovery. With
such a mission embedded in the discipline, how can a conservation biologist's
findings and judgment serve as a proper basis for sound regulatory
decisionmaking?
The regulated community cannot be sanguine about this new era of
regulation for living resources when the science on which it is grounded is poorer,
weaker, and less reliable than the science which serves regulation for non-living
resources.5
4.
Lock the Gate and Leave the Key With Us: No Engineered Solutions.
Despite the mandated ubiquity of scientists, the ESA and other living resources
protection concepts such as biological diversity and ecosystem management
typically do not admit of engineered solutions similar to those the regulated and
regulators together commonly achieve in non-living resource - air, water, and
waste —regulation. The level of knowledge about living resources, particularly
any endangered or threatened species or ecosystem, is almost invariably
insufficient to permit confident consideration of less costly and disruptive
alternatives to secure the necessary regulatory protection. Scientists find it
difficult to risk their professional standing on such minimal information. They are
more comfortable advising that it is better to do nothing or refrain from what is
already being done - or simply withholding advice on acceptable activities -rather than proposing doing something new. This leaves the regulators with the
black and white choice of development or no development.
4 As Professor J.B. Ruhl put it: "The notion of biodiversity lends itself to misuse because it
is so scientifically nascent and 'sufficiently complex that almost any population biology study, with
almost any conclusion, can be framed as an effort to measure or conserve biodiversity.' For that
reason, many people fear biodiversity conservation, not as a concept but as a policy, when put in
the hands of federal regulators." J.B. Ruhl, "Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever-Expanding
Web of Federal Laws Regulating Non-Federal Lands: Time for Something Completely Different?",
66 Colo. L. Rev. 556, 559 (1995) (quoting Gordon H. Rodda, "How To Lie With Biodiversity", 7
Conservation Biology 959 (1993).
5 Messrs. Ruhl and Rodda again: "As one federal regulator and scientist has put it, 'for
scientists to combine partial data with advocacy is counterproductive in the long run.'" Id. at 568
(quoting Rodda at 960).
-7-

Much rhetoric has been offered suggesting that this is not the case —that,
instead, scenarios can be devised which accommodate both living resource
protection and development. And, unquestionably, Secretary Babbitt and his
cohorts have achieved a truly admirable escalation in incidental take permit
approvals, and produced a splendid record of pioneering new procedures, to permit
limited development in the habitat of endangered and threatened species.
Yet, we see significant counter indications. Biological diversity lost what
little support it may have had in the regulated community when environmental
organizations launched show-piece lawsuits, supported by a brief from the Society
for Conservation Biology, to force the Forest Service to preserve biological
diversity in the Chequamegon and Nicolet National Forests.6 The remedy the
plaintiffs requested was the administrative set aside of massive biological diversity
reserves. These reserves were to be untouched by man - no ecosystem
management, no adaptive management, no management period. In April 1994,
the Sierra Club launched its Critical Ecoregions Program, designed to protect and
restore 21 vast regional ecosystems in the United States and Canada. Quite
clearly, the Club does not distinguish between federal and private land. Indeed,
its policy statement reads:
Today, the Sierra Club's mission has more to do with planetary survival
than with scenery ... Already we have found that it is not enough to protect
the Yosemites of the world. We must also save places in between, the
places we - and most of the continent's other species - call home.
And it's not just those obstreperous environmentalists. The President has
determined that so-called ecosystem management in the federal forests of the
Pacific Northwest requires the set-aside of 19 million acres in a motley mix of
late-successional reserves, riparian reserves, and research areas, as well as
wilderness and parks. Accommodating development? The President’s Pacific
Northwest Forests Plan promised yearly sawlog volume at only a fifth of previous
annual timber sale levels. And then, in the first two years, it delivered only a
quarter of what it promised! Indeed, so little development can be accommodated
under the President’s Plan and its ecosystem management philosophy that, when
earlier this year Congressional leaders offered to enact an amendment allowing
substitute timber sales to the provision in the fiscal year 1995 rescissions bill7 that
mandates completion of previously enjoined timber sales of 650 million board feet,
they were told by Forest Service officials that even such modest substitute volume
6 Sierra Club v. Marita, 843 F. Supp. 1526, 1542, and 845 F. Supp. 1317, 1331 (E.D. Wise.
1994), aff'd, 46 F.3d 606, 623 (7th Cir. 1995).
7 P.L. 104-19, § 200l(k); 109 Stat. 194, 246.
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-- a third less than the amount promised yearly in the Plan -- could not be found
on the few remaining areas of federal land left open to timber harvesting.
When the focus shifts from the ESA or ecosystem management to biological
diversity protection all pretense of management or accommodation of development
is dropped ... and understandably. Whereas the landowner may be able to
manipulate (and thus use and develop) a property in a manner that will protect a
single, or discrete number of, endangered or threatened species, any such action
willjiave an unavoidable effect on the overall mix of species - the biodiversity -on the site, benefiting some species and disadvamtagihg others. In short, land use
inevitably alters biological diversity, and an inflexible policy of conserving existing
biological diversity would be hostile to any use whatsoever.
5.
What Due Process? Apparently, judging by the ESA, Congress and
the Executive Branch adhere to the belief that protection of living resources is so
noble a regulatory pursuit that due process procedural protections can be
dispensed with. Enacted at a time when citizen participation and open
government were legislative watchwords, the ESA is an aberration -- a throwback
to an earlier era of lawmaking when the prevailing thought was to let the
professionals perform freely without the irksome interference of the public or
affected parties.
The ESA works a denial of due process by the provisions it so conspicuously
lacks. It offers few hearings; it does not require (and the Executive Branch has
excused itself from) writing National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documents
on critical decisions and thereby considering the effects of, or any alternatives to,
those decisions; it establishes closed, virtually secret procedures (agency
consultations under ESA § 7); and it provides no administrative appeal rights or
opportunities.
And it's not just the ESA. Agencies seemingly feel free to ignore even their
own statutory and regulatory procedural constraints whenever they are engaged
in regulating to protect living resources under any authority. For example, the
Forest Service has invented the new gambit of "interim" policies. When, and only
when, a living resource needs protection, the agency indulges in the convenient
practice of adopting one-size-fits-all, generic "interim" policies that apply to
management activities on federal lands covered by 5, 10, 15 or more individual
resource management plans. The policies are adopted without adherence to any of
the procedures required by the NFMA for amendments to or revisions of resource
management plans, with minimal or no compliance with NEPA, and with wholly
inadequate opportunities for public participation. Indeed, one set of "interim"
policies applicable to national forests throughout eastern Washington and Oregon
was developed in a closed, one-day "bull session" of Forest Service biologists and
was formally announced in a press release!
-9-

These "interim" policies are often implemented without any effort to amend
the underlying resource management plans which, by comparison, were prepared
under rigorous procedures and with frequent opportunities for participation by the
public and affected interests. If the agency decides to amend the plans, however,
it typically does so by fiat, declaring all plans to be amended at once, again with
none of the procedures required for individual plan amendments under the NFMA
and with, at best, a skeletal NEPA document. This practice of imposing generic
, "interim" guidance on multiple units of federal land prevents any meaningful
^ consideration of local conditions that have been addressed so assiduously in the
resource management plans and is indifferent to the many resource management
plan policies -- the management goals and objectives, land use allocations, and
resource output decisions - it overrides.
This rage for interim policymaking has no statutory or regulatory license,
but the Forest Service, in its proposed new planning regulations, intends to grant
itself formal authority to issue "interim amendments" without compliance with
significant NFMA plan amendment procedures.
When regulation for living resources is conducted under the guise of
biological diversity or ecosystem management, even the minimal procedural
safeguards of the ESA are forsaken. Before a landowner can be regulated under
the ESA to protect a living resource, that resource must be the subject of a
rulemaking to determine whether it is endangered or threatened. Yet, with
biological diversity protection and ecosystem management such procedural niceties
are jettisoned. Instead, the agencies are free to regulate to protect any living
resource they please; indeed, to ensure full biological diversity or to manage an
entire ecosystem, they are compelled -- as they see it - to regulate for all living
x resources ... automatically, without rulemaking. The species obtain federal
regulatory protection whether or not they are at risk simply by their presence in
the affected ecosystem.
Then, in a truly perverse and ironic twist, the ESA provides (in lieu of
administrative appeals, consideration of cost-effective alternatives under NEPA,
and other typical procedures to involve, and consider the effect on, the regulated
community) two procedures - the incidental take permit process and the so-called
>5 God Committee - that are extraordinarily costly, time consuming, and, in the
latter case, unavailing. The convenient existence of these two procedures allows
the government to argue effectively whenever a landowner seeks compensation
under the Fifth Amendment that he or she has failed to exhaust administrative
remedies. Thus, the ESA manages to deprive the regulated party of due process
both before and after regulation is imposed.
6.
Unintended Burden Shifting: Let The Private Sector Do It. Living
resources protection laws —at least the ESA —appear to favor the unorthodox
- 10 -

outcome of imposing a much greater obligation on the private sector than on the
public sector. In order for landowners to obtain immunity from the ESA § 9 "take"
prohibition, they must meet standards that are far more stringent, submit to
procedures that are far more complex and time-consuming, and assume costs that
are far more burdensome than those applicable to federal agencies pursuing the
same immunity. This reverse of what should be the proper order of
responsibilities for protected species —federal agencies first, landowners second -may be inadvertent and not what Congress intended, but it is nonetheless the
reality of ESA implementation.
Anyone who doubts that the ESA is biased toward federal agencies and
against private landowners is referred to the chart on the following page. This
chart displays the disparate standards and procedures applicable to federal
agencies and private landowners seeking the "take" immunity. Both wish to
obtain permission to "take" members of endangered or threatened species as the
incidental result of otherwise lawful activities. That permission is received by
federal agencies when the Fish and Wildlife Service provides an incidental take istatement for a federal project at the end of the consultation process under ESA
§ 7(a)(2), and by private landowners when the Fish and Wildlife Service issues an
incidental take permit after approval of a landowner-prepared conservation plan
under ESA § 10(a)(1). The inequities in the two processes are so significant that i
the federal agencies receive immunity hundreds to thousands of time each year,
while landowners (even with the greater emphasis placed on incidental take
permitting by Secretary Babbitt) have obtained immunity less than 150 times in
the last 13 years. The chart displays the reasons for this unfortunate record. For
example:
•
A private landowner must seek an incidental take permit if his or her
activity will harm or harass a single member of a species, whereas a federal
agency can obtain an incidental take statement if its activity is merely found not
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the entire species.
•
A private landowner must seek an incidental take permit if his or her
activity will modify any habitat which the Fish and Wildlife Service might
identify, whereas a federal agency can obtain an incidental take statement if its
activity is merely found not likely to adversely modify only critical habitat which
the Service must designate by rulemaking.
•
A federal agency has the benefit of a procedure that is secret, has a
mandatory 90-day deadline, and features a document (biological opinion) which
the Fish and Wildlife Service, not the agency, prepares, whereas the private
landowner is burdened with a procedure that is public, has no statutory deadline,
and features a document (conservation plan) which the landowner, not the Service,
must prepare.
- 11 -

INEQUITIES IN PROCEDURES AND STANDARDS FOR
FEDERAL AGENCIES AND NONFEDERAL LANDOWNERS TO OBTAIN
DETERMINATIONS BY FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE
OF ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT COMPLIANCE ("TAKE" IMMUNITY)
PRIVATE. STATE & LOCAL LANDOWNERS

FEDERAL AGENCIES
Projects receive Incidental Take Statements after review
by FWS under consultation procedures of ESA § 7

Projects receive Incidental Take Permits after submission
of conservation plans for review by FWS under ESA §10

STANDARDS
Granted "take" immunity if project is not likely to
jeopardize continued existence of entire species

Compelled to seek "take" immunity if project is likely to
harm or harass a sinele member of the species

Granted "take" immunity if project is not likely to
adversely modify critical habitat which FWS has
designated by rule

Compelled to seek "take" immunity if project adversely
modifies any habitat which FWS identifies without
rulemaking
PROCEDURES

No additional procedures necessary
to receive "take" immunity

Costly and time-consuming procedures required
to obtain "take" immunity
DURATION

FWS must decide in 90 davs

FWS has no time limit to decide -- typically, 1-5 years
COST

Little cost since FWS prepares biological opinion

Steep costs, typically in $ 100,000's, since landowner
prepares and implements the conservation plan
FREQUENCY

Immunity is granted through consultations which
occur 7.600+ times each year

Immunity is granted through the issuance
of less than 150 permits in 13 years
VISIBILITY

Review process is closed:
No hearing;
No public participation

Review process is open:
Public hearing must be held;
Activists and public officials may be invited to join a
steering committee to consider and revise the
landowner's plan
ANTI-TRUST

Anti-trust laws do not apply

Anti-trust laws do apply: no immunity even with
issuance of the permit
EXEMPTION

Exemption procedure is available to federal agency
through application to Endangered Species Committee

Exemption procedure is not available to landowner

PROPERTY RIGHTS
Property rights are not affected when FWS fails to issue
Incidental Take Statement for federal project

Property rights may be lost when FWS denies or heavily
conditions Incidental Take Permit for a landowner's
activities
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•
Accordingly, while the federal agency is not subjected to a hearing,
can demand a Fish and Wildlife Service decision in 90 days, and does not have to
incur any significant additional costs in order to obtain an incidental take
statement, the landowner must submit to a hearing and perhaps a steering
committee of activists and local officials, undergo an application process with a
duration of anywhere from one to five years, and suffer costs as high as hundreds
of thousands of dollars to prepare a conservation plan in order to obtain an
incidental take permit.
There are other inequities displayed in the chart, but one that is not: even
after all of the procedures imposed on a landowner are conducted, before an
incidental take permit may be issued the decision to issue still must undergo the
very same consultation procedures that federal agencies must follow. Therefore,
the landowners not only must run (more accurately, crawl) the gauntlet of
procedures applied solely to them (as displayed in the second column of the chart),
but then must turn around and sprint (stagger) back through a second gauntlet of
the procedures applied to federal agencies (as displayed in the first column).
The regulated community sees no respite from regulation of private lands
when living resources are protected not through the ESA, but instead under the
concepts of biological diversity and ecosystem management. We are told
continually by agency officials not to worry -- that these concepts are to be applied
only on federal lands. Yet, with virtually the next breath, these officials note that
ecosystems and biological diversity cross, and must be considered across,
ownership boundaries. And nothing we’ve seen leads us to believe that ownership
boundaries will be honored. Examples from the Executive Branch:
The President's Commission on Environmental Quality issued a report
entitled "Biodiversity on Private Lands." Federal agency officials participated in a
conference at the Forest Policy Center, Yale School of Forestry, entitled "Building
Partnerships for Ecosystem Management on Mixed Ownerships." The Forest
Ecosystem Management Assessment Team responsible for developing the
President’s Northwest Forests Policy described its voluminous report8 as "Phase 1"
of a multi-phased plan to adopt ecosystem management. Phase 1 is for federal
lands (what, pray tell, will be Phase 2?).
And, it's not just studies. On September 19, 1991, four federal agencies (the
same agencies - Forest Service, BLM, National Park Service, and Fish and
Wildlife Service - whose officials have been so quick with the feckless assurances
of private lands exclusion) joined with four State agencies to sign a memorandum
8 Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team (USFS, NMFS, BLM, FWS, NPS, EPA),
Forest Ecosystem Management: An Ecological Economic, and Social Assessment. July 1993.
- 13 -

of understanding, entitled "California's Coordinated Regional Strategy to Conserve
Biological Diversity." The signatories pledged "to make maintenance and
enhancement of biological diversity a preeminent goal in their protection and
management policies" - preeminent, it seems, over whatever may be their
statutory missions and guidance. They made it abundantly clear that their
intention was to regulate not just federal and State, but also private, lands:
In addition, the signatories agree to pursue the development of local and
regional institutions and practices necessary to conserve biological diversity.
These tools may include the establishment of mitigation and development
banks, planning and zoning authorities, land and reserve acquisition,
incentives, alternative land management practices, restoration, and fees and
[last, but never least] regulation.
Public lands are to be given first preference as reserves and
conservation areas. Impacts on private lands will be minimized to the
degree possible.
The Council on Environmental Quality and the Fish and Wildlife Service
have embraced private lands with a vengeance. The Council, in new advice on
considering biological diversity effects in NEPA documents, has stated:
[Biodiversity cannot be adequately conserved on the federal level alone.
Even though federal lands and resources play a major role, the protection of
biological resources will require concerted efforts by all levels of government
and the private sector.9
The Service has called for an "ecosystem approach to fish and wildlife conservation
that will involve as the agency's partners in its "holistic management strategies"
the "other federal agencies, states, tribes, local communities, corporate and
individual landowners, and other organizations."10
The concepts of biological diversity protection and ecosystem management
also have trespassed upon private lands whenever they have appeared in
9

Council on Environmental Quality, Executive Office of the President, Incorporating
Biodiversity Considerations into Environmental Impact analysis Under the National
Environmental Policy Act (1993) at 16-17.
10 Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior, An Ecosystem Approach to Fish and
Wildlife Conservation: An Approach to More Effectively Conserve the Nation's Biodiversity (1994)
at 1 and 3.
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Congressional activity. The Clean Water Act reauthorization bill that was
reported out of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works last
Congress added these concepts to all the principal water pollution programs
applicable to private lands - National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
permits, dredge and fill permits, nonpoint source programs, and watershed
planning. Most frightening, however, are virtually identical bills to enshrine
biological diversity in national policy that have been introduced in several
Congresses by senior Democrats, some of whom had been chairmen of the
committees of jurisdiction prior to this "Contract" Congress (<e.g. Senator
Moynihan, Rep. Studds, and Rep. Scheuer). Of course, the bills would require all
federal land management to be conducted to conserve biological diversity, making
biological diversity the overarching, umbrella environmental protection standard.
But, they did not stop there; these bills quite clearly embraced private lands in the
cause of biological diversity protection. They would require all federal agency
actions - including all permitting on private lands - to be conducted to conserve
biological diversity; order the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) to publish
regulations to include biological diversity analysis in environmental assessments
and environmental impact statements on federal agency actions, including
permitting on private land; direct the CEQ to identify what would be endangered
and threatened "biotic communities" on private, as well as federal, lands; require
all federal agencies to review programs and report to the President on how those
programs should be changed administratively or legislatively to better conserve
biological diversity; and establish an interagency working committee on biological
diversity to develop a coordinated federal strategy for conserving biological
diversity.
When faced with these harbingers of future statutory and regulatory
controls on private land to conserve biological diversity and the likelihood that
biological diversity protection requires no use whatsoever be made of the land (see
point 4 above), the regulated community will not be reconciled quickly or easily to
the biological diversity concept.11
11 As Professor Ruhl summarizes this issue:
The focus of federal involvement... increasingly has been to establish a regime of
biodiversity regulation through environmental controls of development on
nonfederal lands. The emphasis on regulation of nonfederal lands is not entirely
misdirected as much of our nation's biological resources reside there. The approach
for dealing with such areas, however, has been to inject the federal regulatory
scheme into the heart of the most basic of state, local and private land use
decisions, often to the sharp resentment of state and local jurisdictions and private
interests.
Ruhl, supra note 4, at 561 (emphasis in original).
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Some would say: wait a minute — if, or more properly when, biological
diversity protection or ecosystem management is extended to private lands, it will
be in the form of incentives, not regulatory prohibitions. Sure. If those incentives
are anything like the incentives proposed by Secretary Babbitt, they are nothing
more than the opportunity to be relieved from a regulatory prohibition and civil
and criminal sanctions that would otherwise be imposed. First, we threaten you
with injunctions against the use of your property, and throw in civil and criminal
punishment for good measure; then we offer you as an "incentive" to avoid that
fearful fate the opportunity to "voluntarily" agree to impose on yourself all sorts of
use constraints and mitigating costs. The word "incentive" is truly corrupted
when it is employed in such a manner.
7. Don't Just Quit What You're Doing. Do Something For Us. The ESA
is the first environmental law which can be manipulated not only to require
private landowners to refrain from productive economic activity in order to avoid
damaging the environment, but also to impose on them the affirmative obligation
and costs to actively manage their lands for the sole purpose of improving the
environment. Several court decisions12 have made it clear that all "persons"
subject to the "take" prohibition of ESA §9 may not only be barred from altering
habitat of listed species to the species' detriment but also be made to alter the
habitat for the species' benefit. Landowners can be forced to spend money on their
property to improve the living conditions for any fish, wildlife, or plants that five
there, or can be induced to live there, without any ability to generate even
off-setting income from that property. At least, with rare exceptions, under the
environmental laws requiring regulation for non-living resources, a landowner
may make the admittedly unhappy choice of refraining from using his or her
property at all and thereby avoid federal regulation. Not so under the ESA;
federal regulators may wield that authority to tell you that you are not allowed
not to use your property - instead, you must use it as they say.
Needless to add, if this presages how future living resource protection
regulation treats private land, the regulated community will be distressed.
8. Whatever Happened To Site Specific Decisionmaking? Regulation On
An Extraordinary Scale. Under the ESA, critical habitat for the northern spotted
owl covers 6.9 million acres of federal land in three States; the proposed rule
governing private land activities in northern spotted owl habitat directly impacts

12

Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources, 649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw.
1986), aff'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988); Sierra Club v. Lyng, 649 F. Supp. 1991 (E.D. Tex.
1988), aff'd, Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991).
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20.9 million acres, relaxing ESA "take" requirements on only 409,000 acres.13
Over 6.5 million acres in four States, including over one million acres of private
lands, have been designated as critical habitat for the desert tortoise, while 1980
linear miles of the lower Colorado River and its shorelines have received such
designation for four endangered fish. Ecosystem management operates on a
similar or even grander scale. The President's Northwest Forest Plan applies to
24 milhon acres of federal land in three States, the Interior Columbia Basin
Ecosystem Management Project covers 75 milhon acres of federal land (48 national
forests and BLM districts) in four States.
Companies and landowners have been accustomed to addressing their fate
under non-living resource environmental laws on a site-specific basis or, at worse,
within a discrete, relatively small airshed or watershed. Now a decision of an
ecoregion planner hundreds of miles and several States removed can dictate where
and when a timber sale may be held, grazing may occur, etc., without any
opportunity for the affected party to offer his or her own views. Worse, there is no
effective avenue for the affected party to offer, or the regulator to consider,
alternatives tailored to specific site conditions. Decisionmaking at this scale
inevitably leads to a sense in the regulated of disenfranchisement from the
regulatory process.
And, to the frustration of the companies, developers, and landowners, there
is no place within these vast regions to escape. Even on a site in the most
pristine, least polluted, harshest landscape, there will always be myriad
ecosystems and biological diversity to contend with. Indeed, in contrast with the
usual application of non-living resources law, when regulation is intended to
protect living resources it is likely to be more prevalent and intrusive in
undisturbed areas than in developed areas.
9. Toward Free-Form Regulation Unfettered Bv Rules Or Standards.
The regulated community has found that the living resource regulators treat
statutory and regulatory standards cavalierly. Field biologists confuse the
"jeopardy" standard of ESA § 7 with the "take" standard of ESA § 9 and find that
the taking of even one member of an endangered or threatened species somehow
may "jeopardize the continued existence" of that entire species. These same
officials suffer a similar disability in applying the test established by the
regulation which defines "take" involving habitat modification (50 C.F.R. § 17.3).
In a deposition of a Regional Director - that's right, a Regional Director - of the
Fish and Wildlife Service we took a year ago, that official managed to say that
habitat modification alone constitutes a "take" despite the fact that the regulation
13 Comments of the American Forest & Paper Association to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service - Region 1 Regarding the Proposed Special Rule for the Conservation of the Northern
Spotted Owl on Non-Federal Lands, May 31, 1996.
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establishes a three part test of which habitat modification is only the first part ~
there must be (1) "significant habitat modification," which (2) "significantly
impair[s] essential behavioral patterns" that (3) "actually kills or injures wildlife."
How'd the Regional Director do it? Simple. He opined that habitat modification
(forget "significant") always alters behavior (forget "essential"), and any change in
behavior is injury ("actual"?).
And, it seemingly doesn't matter how many times the agency informs its
personnel in guidance documents that only federal agencies have an obligation to
pursue "conservation" (defined as recovery by ESA § 3) of threatened or
endangered species and that landowners cannot be compelled, even in the
so-called "habitat conservation plans," to conserve species, but only to avoid "take."
In defiance of that guidance, Fish and Wildlife Service officials continue to insist
in approving such plans, in promulgating rules under ESA § 4(d), and in
demanding reasonable and prudent measures in consultation on federal permits
that landowners take actions the purpose of which is clearly species conservation.
Although the regulated community may take cold comfort in ESA standards
that are so readily ignored in practice, it nonetheless is comfort. The community
is even more troubled by the newer concepts of ecosystem management and
biological diversity which seemingly have no standards, rules, or definitions
whatsoever ... an ideal breeding ground for wholly subjective decisionmaking
unburdened by the threat of any judicial disciplining. Take ecosystem
management. Never mind that there is no commonly accepted definition of an
ecosystem, that an ecosystem can be as small as a single spring or plot of ground
or as large as a multi-state region (Greater Yellowstone, Columbia Basin, etc.) and
every conceivable size in between, that any one site can be located simultaneously
within hundreds of different ecosystems each defined by different criteria or by
officials with different interests and each possessing different regulatory
imperatives, that designation of an ecosystem and delineation of its boundaries are
as much an art form as science, that our knowledge about how any ecosystem
operates is truly rudimentary, or that to "manage" an ecosystem of any size likely
requires the politically impossible task of removing existing management
designations such as wilderness, national parks, etc.14 This concept of ecosystem
management is so vague and ephemeral —so susceptible to subjective judgment or
bias - that the agencies can make of it anything they please and be free of any
challenge; it provides no law for the agencies to apply or the courts to enforce.
This was brought home by statements of Chief Thomas in a June 1994 Forest
Service leadership meeting:
The description with the most frightening implications for regulation: "An ecosystem is a
process ... You never step into the same ecosystem twice." J. Cohen and I. Stewart, The Collapse
6f Chaos: Discovering Simplicity in a Complex World. 367 (1994).
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What is ecosystem management? I will tell you my concept ~ which, of
course, is only my view. [Only his view? Does each and every other Forest
Service official have "only his [or her] view"?] ... New efforts by scientists,
philosophers, technologists, leaders and managers can be targeted at the
sharpening of evolving [ecosystem] concepts and practices. [Did you catch
that? "Philosophers" right after "scientists" and before "leaders and
managers."] ... Under ecosystem management, small scale actions are
judged and tracked for their contributions to particular desired future
conditions. These conditions are to be nurtured in the constantly evolving
pattern that makes up the multi-scale ecosystem tapestry." [Well now,
there's a constantly evolving, multi-scale -- but otherwise readily understood
and easily applied ~ standard the law and the regulated can get their hands
around. In fact, you would need "philosophers" to discern the meaning of
the "constantly evolving pattern that makes up the multi-scale ecosystem
tapestry."]

What is most distressing is that this policy - which has no sanction from
statute and appears nowhere in the agencies' regulations - is allowed, indeed
expected, to override long-standing, truly statutory and regulatory policies such as
multiple use and sustained yield. And now, the Forest Service intends to correct
its regulatory silence and formalize the investiture of ecosystem management as
the autocratic monarch of federal land planning in its proposed planning
regulations.
Biological diversity? A recent law review article that was, in fact, favorable
to the ecosystem management and biological diversity concepts allowed biological
diversity definitions to speak for themselves to demonstrate how devoid of
standards that concept is:
Definitions employed by conservationists and scientists fail to provide
concrete factors useful for setting legal standards. For instance, current
theories focus on the benefits of biodiversity, which simply refer to the
"variety of life." Ecosystem biodiversity in particular is defined as "the
various assemblages of plants, animals, and microorganisms that occur in
different physical settings."15
As Professor Ruhl put it: "Biodiversity is an elusive concept in science and
law ... It is no wonder that, given the uncertainty of the scientific community

15 L.M. Bernstein, "Ecosystem Communities: Zoning Principles to Promote Conservation and
the Economy," 35 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1309 (1995).
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about what diversity is, environmental law has charted no clear directions
Amen.
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* * * * * * * *

Well there you have it. At last, the diatribe is over. Certainly, the
regulated community's views of living resources are neither as homogeneous nor
as bleak as I have suggested here. However, I urge those of you who graciously
listened to me to take to heart the concerns I've discussed. With all the positive
that has been expressed in this conference about living resources protection, it
would be a shame if neglect of the negative left that protection unrealized.

16

Ruhl, supra note 4, at 564-565.
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